highlights
- A wide range of influential actors view the Iran nuclear deal as an element of stability as well as a mine of opportunities for Western companies.
- There is a high level of fatigue and scepticism because of America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
- Many Western countries don’t want to be associated with Trump, should he take forceful measures against Iran.
Some Western countries seem to cast doubts on the role of Iran in attacking six oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman as well as oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. Three reasons may help explain why.
First, there is the Iran nuclear deal.
Amassing support for it in several Western think-tanks and media was necessary to shape public opinion and party politics to cement the deal. That created a narrative about Iran, regional stability, and the future of both.
This narrative became a capital for Iran. Now this capital is by default defence to stonewall any response to Iranian operations, attacks, and militias.
A wide range of influential actors (in academia, think-tanks, media, politics, economics) view the nuclear deal as an element of stability as well as a mine of opportunities for Western companies.
As a consequence, if someone backs the Iran deal, then there is a tendency that she (or he) would refrain from criticising Iran, in any way, except the occasional mild stuff (which seems to serve to legitimise the act or refraining from criticism in the first place).
Also, if someone supports the deal, then there seems to be very little regard, if any, for concerns over Iranian expansionism and Iranian revisionism in our region.
Iran creates militias based on sectarian alliances, hence sectarianism becomes an important tool of its foreign policy.
These militias operate at the expense of the states’ monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, thereby hindering the nation-state.
Tehran wants to make these militias part of the regional order. Thus, restructuring the regional order becomes important. If someone is pro-deal, all of that then is anecdotal.
Consequences
One consequence of the deal is that Iran got $150 billion, which it spent on militias.
In that sense, it was an enabling factor for Iranian expansionism. Yet, the deal is still viewed as an element of stability and a treasure trove of opportunities for Western companies.
Also, alongside other reasons, US administration’s withdrawal from the deal largely damaged Trump's credibility. Everything he says or does is doubted.
There is an automatic sympathy for those against whom he speaks. That undermines any effort to objectively look at the impact of Iranian expansionism and revisionism on regional stability.
Some countries might not be willing to blame Iran now, despite everything, but if Tehran keeps attacking ships and oil facilities, eventually those countries would have to release their intelligence reports and speak up.
Second, there is a high level of fatigue and scepticism because of the Afghanistan war and the Iraq war. The Bush administration bluffed about the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in Iraq in order to create a pretext for invasion.
That invasion crippled the security structures of the region and created a strategic void, which Iran and terrorist groups (such as Hezbollah of Iraq, Daesh, and Abu Alfadhle Al Abbas Brigade) are attempting to fill. Any attempt to curb Iranian attacks on oil tankers is understood in that light.
In other words, an attempt to safeguard maritime lanes from Iranian attacks is seen as another "American lie" as well as another strategic void in the making.
Third, there seems to be a reluctance in the international community to blame Iran for what it is doing in the Arabian Gulf. Many countries don’t want to be associated with Trump, should he take forceful measures against Iran.
Other countries believe that living with Iranian attacks on oil tankers, on oil facilities, and paying ransoms to Iranian militias across the Middle East is less costly than keeping Iran in check.
Some other countries benefit from seeing the US administration dragged into a difficult position and its resources drained in party politics (with elections ahead) as well as with its allies. In that sense, they have no interest in releasing their intelligence reports.
History forgotten
This context makes the US look like a villain and Iran a victim. Yes, you read it right: the same Iran that did all what you know, and many other things you do not know, is somehow seen as a "victim".
It is also because of this context that there seems to be a systematic refusal to recall Iran’s history in attacking ships, blowing up embassies, assassinating diplomats, creating militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and elsewhere.
It is because of this context that there are people who would rather believe that the Al Houthi militia in Yemen bought ballistic missiles on Amazon than believe that Iran provided those missiles.
It is also because of this context that there seems to be a systematic refusal to recall Iran’s history in attacking ships, blowing up embassies, assassinating diplomats, creating militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and elsewhere.
This context makes Hezbollah and chemical weapons in Syria disappear. Harbouring Al Qaida operatives, Iran’s role in blowing up Al Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the Beirut barracks bombings … etc all of that is forgotten.
It is because of this context that there are people who would rather believe that the Al Houthi militia in Yemen bought ballistic missiles on Amazon than believe that Iran provided those missiles.
Even recent threats of Khamenei, Rouhani, and a dozen Iranian generals about closing the Strait of Hormuz are forgotten. Iran’s history in attempting to do so in the 80s is also forgotten.
The fact of the matter is that no one should expect the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to hold a press conference and assume responsibility for the attacks.
However, and strategically speaking, the most difficult challenge that Iran is facing right now is the steady, gradual increase of economic pressure. Breaking that becomes a priority for Tehran.
One way of overcoming that pressure is to drive oil prices through the roof. That raises the cost on Iran’s enemies as well as increases the gains of the little oil Tehran might manage to sell.
Another way of breaking that steadiness is to push the region to the brink of war. If the international community thinks war is imminent, there will be a scramble to rush to the negotiating table.
Iran might think that this improves its negotiating position. What better way to achieve both, high oil prices and the threat of war, than to attack oil tankers within less than 10 miles from Iranian shores?
‘Iranian trick’
The trick then lies in carrying out the attacks without losing Iran capital (which we discussed earlier). Thus, there must be a plausible deniability on the one hand.
On the other hand, the damage to the ships must be limited and contained, so as not to cause an uncontrollable outrage.
This is the "Iranian trick".
Any conflict would be extremely harmful to Saudi Arabia, and strategic planners in Riyadh seem to be very aware of that. In order to counter Iranian expansionism and revisionism, the best scenario for the Arabian kingdom is to maintain a steady economic pressure on Tehran and to keep the conversation about its role going.
Some countries might not be willing to blame Iran now, despite everything, but if Tehran keeps attacking ships and oil facilities, eventually those countries would have to release their intelligence reports and speak up.
However, several questions remain unanswered. How many free-pass attacks does Iran still have?
Will it always be able to maintain the "Iranian trick"?
And for how long can abstaining countries, such as Germany, keep their intelligence reports a secret?
Just three years after Obama left office, his secret of the Iranian explosive stockpiles in London was revealed. Eventually, all secrets find their way to the public eye.
Dr. Mansour Almarzoqi is the assistant professor of political science and the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Prince Saud Al Faisal Institute for Diplomatic Studies in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
